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What’s It to You: The First Amendment and 
Matters of Public Concern 
Mark Strasser∗* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Snyder v. Phelps,1 the Supreme Court of the United States struck 
down a damages award against Reverend Fred Phelps, Sr., reaffirming that 
the First Amendment protects discussions on matters of public concern.2  In 
doing so, the Court underscored the importance of the distinction between 
matters of public concern and matters of mere private interest.  Yet, if that 
distinction is to do constitutional work, the Court should articulate clear crite-
ria for determining which speech falls into one category and which falls into 
the other.  Regrettably, the Court has sent contradictory signals with respect 
to how the two can be distinguished.  The Court must do more than merely 
say, “It depends,” if there is to be any hope of clarifying this increasingly 
important area of the law.  
This Article traces the development of the “matters of public concern” 
doctrine, explaining the role that the concept has played in cases ranging from 
defamation3 to employment termination to publication of (allegedly) private 
facts.4  The Article discusses various inconsistencies in the Court’s jurispru-
dence, both with respect to what counts as a matter of public concern5 and 
with respect to the relative importance of the protection of such matters.6  It 
concludes that the current jurisprudence cannot help but cause confusion and 
inconsistent results in the lower courts and must be clarified at the earliest 
opportunity.7  
  
 * Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio.  
I would like to thank Professor Susan Gilles for her helpful discussions of these and 
related issues. 
 1. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
 2. See id. at 1215  (“[S]peech on ‘matters of public concern’ . . . is ‘at the heart 
of the First Amendment’s protection.’” (omission in original) (quoting Dun & Brad-
street, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985))). 
 3. See infra Parts II.A-B. 
 4. See infra Part II.C. 
 5. See infra Part II.A. 
 6. See infra notes 111-39 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra Part III. 
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II.  MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN 
The “matters of public concern” doctrine has changed radically over the 
last half century.  In New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court’s focus was on 
discussions of governmental operations,8 although what was included in the 
public concern category expanded in subsequent cases.  Then, the Court tried 
to restrict the category, suggesting that there were limits on what counted as a 
matter of public concern without specifying what those limits were.  At the 
same time that the Court was seeking to limit what counted as a matter of 
public concern, the Court sent mixed signals about how important it was as a 
constitutional matter to protect such discussions.  These mixed signals re-
sulted in a jurisprudence that not only offers too little specification of what 
counts as a matter of public concern but that also offers varying degrees of 
protection for discussions that obviously fall into that category.  In short, we 
have an area of law that is becoming increasingly important and increasingly 
amorphous at the same time. This Article illustrates this increasing ambiguity 
by explaining the origins, and subsequent changes, in the public concern doc-
trine both in defamation and in non-defamation cases.  
A.  What Counts as a Matter of Public Concern? 
In New York Times v. Sullivan (NYT),9 the Court noted the long-
established proposition that “freedom of expression upon public questions is 
secured by the First Amendment.”10  The Framers included free speech guar-
antees within the Constitution, at least in part, because of the dangers posed 
by “occasional tyrannies of governing majorities.”11  Thus, any examination 
of the contours of the First Amendment’s speech protections should be con-
ducted “against the background of a profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleas-
antly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”12  The NYT Court 
announced a constitutional “rule that prohibits a public official from recover-
ing damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless 
he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’ – that is, with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false 
or not.”13 This Article explains the development of the public concern doc-
trine for public officials, public figures, and private individuals, and then 
  
 8. 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964). 
 9. 376 U.S. 254. 
 10. Id. at 269. 
 11. Id. at 270 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring), vacated, 47 S. Ct. 641 (1927)). 
 12. Id. (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)). 
 13. Id. at 279-80. 
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describes some of the ways that the Court has undercut both the clarity and 
the importance of the very distinctions that it has drawn.  
1. Public Officials 
The Constitution protects criticism of public officials because the con-
duct of public officials is a matter of great public concern.  In Garrison v. 
Louisiana,14 the Court explained that where “the criticism is of public offi-
cials and their conduct of public business, the interest in [the officials’] pri-
vate reputation[s] is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the 
Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.”15  Yet, the Garrison Court ex-
plained that the Constitution does not only protect true statements.  On the 
contrary, “even where the utterance is false, the great principles of the Consti-
tution which secure freedom of expression in this area preclude attaching 
adverse consequences to any except the knowing or reckless falsehood.”16  A 
different rule, e.g., that a false statement creates potential liability whenever 
made by someone who has enmity for the public official allegedly defamed, 
runs too great a risk of chilling political speech.17 
The knowing falsehood is subjected to less forgiving treatment.  The 
Garrison Court explained that even at the time of the First Amendment’s 
adoption, “there were those unscrupulous enough and skillful enough to use 
the deliberate or reckless falsehood as an effective political tool to unseat the 
public servant or even topple an administration.”18  The fact that the knowing 
falsehood was used to achieve political ends did not afford such a statement 
constitutional immunity.19  “Calculated falsehood[s] . . . ‘are no essential part 
of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth 
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the 
social interest in order and morality.’”20 
Once calculated falsehoods have been excluded from consideration, 
however, much information and opinion about public officials is of public 
interest and part of protected free speech.  The NYT Court stated that there is 
a “paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the people con-
cerning public officials, their servants.”21  Protected speech includes some 
  
 14. 379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
 15. Id. at 72-73. 
 16. Id. at 73. 
 17. Id. (“Debate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the speaker must run 
the risk that it will be proved in court that he spoke out of hatred; even if he did speak 
out of hatred, utterances honestly believed contribute to the free interchange of ideas 
and the ascertainment of truth.”). 
 18. Id. at 75. 
 19. Id. (“That speech is used as a tool for political ends does not automatically 
bring it under the protective mantle of the Constitution.”). 
 20. Id. (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). 
 21. Id. at 77. 
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discussions of a more personal nature, because “[f]ew personal attributes are 
more germane to fitness for office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper 
motivation.”22  Accordingly, some personal details about public officials are 
considered matters of public concern.  Of course, some public officials have 
vast responsibilities while others do not, and the NYT Court did not specify 
the degree of power that would trigger the actual malice standard.23  
The Court addressed that issue more fully in Rosenblatt v. Baer.24  The 
Rosenblatt Court explained that “the ‘public official’ designation applies . . . 
to those . . . government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, 
substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental 
affairs.”25  After all, there is “a strong interest in debate on public issues, and, 
second, a strong interest in debate about those persons who are in a position 
significantly to influence the resolution of those issues.”26  Because 
“[c]riticism of government is at the very center of the constitutionally pro-
tected area of free discussion[,]”27 a great deal of discussion about high-
ranking officials is protected free speech. 
2.  The Inclusion of Public Figures and Private Citizens 
While government policies and practices are a matter of public concern, 
they are not the only matters of public concern.  The “guarantees for speech 
and press are not the preserve of political expression or comment upon public 
affairs.”28   In Time Inc. v. Hill,29 the Court noted “the vast range of published 
matter which exposes persons to public view, both private citizens and public 
officials[,]” 30 and worried that there would be a “grave risk of serious im-
pairment of the indispensable service of a free press in a free society if we 
  
 22. Id.; see also Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 275 (1971) (“Given 
the realities of our political life, it is by no means easy to see what statements about a 
candidate might be altogether without relevance to his fitness for the office he 
seeks.”).  But see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.  472 U.S. 749, 
767 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (“Criticism and assessment of the performance of 
public officials and of government in general are not subject to penalties imposed by 
law.  But these First Amendment values are not at all served by circulating false 
statements of fact about public officials.”). 
 23. See  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 n.23 (“We have no occa-
sion here to determine how far down into the lower ranks of government employees 
the ‘public official’ designation would extend for purposes of this rule, or otherwise 
to specify categories of persons who would or would not be included.”). 
 24. 383 U.S. 75 (1966). 
 25. Id. at 85. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967). 
 29. 385 U.S. 374. 
 30. Id. at 388. 
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 77, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol77/iss4/4
File: StrasserPaginated.docx Created on: 6/24/13 10:12 PM Last Printed: 11/3/13 8:05 PM 
2012] WHAT’S IT TO YOU 1087 
 
saddle the press with the impossible burden of verifying … the facts associ-
ated in news articles with a person’s name, picture or portrait, particularly as 
related to nondefamatory matter.”31  The Hill Court thereby suggested that 
much discussion of private citizens’ lives was a matter of public concern and 
that matters of public concern were not limited to matters of governance. 
Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts32 expanded protections for the me-
dia and extended the NYT’s standard to public figures as well as to public 
officials.33  The Butts decision involved two defamation cases that had been 
consolidated, one involving Wally Butts and the other involving Edwin 
Walker.34  Curtis Publishing Company accused Butts, an employee of the 
Georgia Athletic Association, a private corporation,35 of giving significant 
secrets about Georgia’s plays and defensive patterns to the University of Ala-
bama’s football coach, Paul Bryant.36  Another publication alleged that Gen-
eral Edwin Walker led a charge against federal marshals who had been sent to 
maintain order and to enforce a court order requiring the University of Mis-
sissippi to desegregate by enrolling James Meredith.37   
Curtis Publishing argued both that Butts had such a significant role in 
“state administration”38 that he should be treated as if he were a public offi-
cial, and that “the public interest in education in general, and in the conduct 
of the athletic affairs of educational institutions in particular, justifies consti-
tutional protection of discussion of persons involved in it equivalent to the 
protection afforded discussion of public officials.”39  General Walker, a “man 
of some political prominence,”40 had made a number of statements against 
federal intervention to promote integration.41   
  
 31. Id. at 389.  The Hill test does not impose an impossible burden on false light 
plaintiffs.  See Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974) (reinstating the 
trial court’s false light damages verdict for a publication made with knowledge of the 
assertion’s falsity or with a reckless disregard for their truth). 
 32. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
 33. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 14 (1990) (“[I]n Curtis 
Publishing Co. v. Butts, a majority of the Court determined ‘that the New York Times 
test should apply to criticism of “public figures” as well as “public officials.”’” (inter-
nal citation omitted)).   
 34. See Butts, 388 U.S. at 135 (“These two libel actions, although they arise out 
of quite different sets of circumstances . . . are best treated together in one opinion.”). 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. at 136. 
 37. Id. at 140 (“The dispatch stated that respondent Walker, who was present on 
the campus, had taken command of the violent crowd and had personally led a charge 
against federal marshals sent there to effectuate the Court’s decree and to assist in 
preserving order.”). 
 38. Id. at 146. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. at 141. 
 41. Id. 
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The Butts plurality noted that both of the allegedly defamed individuals 
“commanded sufficient continuing public interest and had sufficient access to 
the means of counterargument to be able ‘to expose through discussion the 
falsehood and fallacies’ of the defamatory statements.”42  Because these indi-
viduals were readily distinguishable from private citizens, the plurality con-
cluded that “libel actions of the present kind cannot be left entirely to state 
libel laws, unlimited by any overriding constitutional safeguard[.]”43  Rather, 
a more demanding standard was to be used – “a ‘public figure’ who is not a 
public official may also recover damages for a defamatory falsehood whose 
substance makes substantial danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of 
highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the stan-
dards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible pub-
lishers.”44  While the language employed by the plurality did not mirror the 
actual malice standard, that language nonetheless set a high bar for those pub-
lic figures seeking to collect defamation damages and was later interpreted to 
be the equivalent of the actual malice standard for public officials.45  
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,46 the plurality employed a very pro-
tective standard even though no public figures were involved.  At issue were 
broadcasts in which the plaintiff was described as selling “obscene” litera-
ture47 and, with his business associates, as being “smut distributors” and 
“girlie-book peddlers.”48  A trial court had ruled as a matter of law that the 
nudist magazines sold by the plaintiff were “not obscene.”49  
The Rosenbloom plurality noted that “the police campaign to enforce the 
obscenity laws was an issue of public interest,”50 and that the Constitution 
limits the power of the states to award damages to an individual allegedly 
defamed.51  The question before the Court was whether Rosenbloom, a pri-
vate individual, could be successful in his defamation action if he could prove 
that the false statements broadcasted about him resulted “from a failure of 
respondent to exercise reasonable care”52 or whether, instead, he could only 
be successful if he proved actual malice – that “the falsehoods were broadcast 
  
 42. Id. at 155 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Bran- 
deis, J., concurring)). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 335 (1974) (“Three years 
after [New York Times], a majority of the Court agreed to extend the constitutional 
privilege to defamatory criticism of ‘public figures.’”). 
 46. 403 U.S. 29 (1971), abrogated by Gertz, 418 U.S. 323. 
 47. Id. at 36. 
 48. Id.  
 49. Id. at 36. 
 50. Id. at 40. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Id.  
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with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they 
were false or not.”53 
When analyzing whether the actual malice standard should be employed 
when the plaintiff is a private figure, the plurality noted that “[s]elf-
governance in the United States presupposes far more than knowledge and 
debate about the strictly official activities of various levels of government.”54  
Because “vast areas of economic and social power that vitally affect the na-
ture and quality of life in the Nation”55 are in “private hands,”56 it is neces-
sary to protect robust discussion of “far more than politics in a narrow 
sense.”57 
When suggesting that matters of public concern include far more than 
politics narrowly construed, the Rosenbloom plurality sought to justify using 
the actual malice standard even when the allegedly defamatory statement was 
not about a public official or public figure.  After all, when “a matter is a 
subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely 
because a private individual is involved.”58  Because the focus is on the issue 
itself, the plurality expressed its “commitment to robust debate on public 
issues, which is embodied in the First Amendment, by extending constitu-
tional protection to all discussion and communication involving matters of 
public or general concern[.]”59  Yet, the focus of Rosenbloom’s complaint 
was not about the police crackdown on obscenity as a general matter, but 
merely that he had wrongly been accused of selling obscene materials and 
that the defamatory accusation had resulted in business losses.60 
The Rosenbloom analysis was very protective of speech in a few differ-
ent respects.  First, it employed the actual malice standard even when no pub-
lic officials or public figures were involved.61  Second, when deciding 
whether the issue was a matter of public concern, the Rosenbloom plurality 
viewed the facts before it at an increased level of generality.  The matter of 
public concern was not merely whether Rosenbloom had been wrongly ac-
cused of being a smut peddler but, instead, the police crackdown on pornog-
raphy more generally.62 
  
 53. Id. at 41. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 43. 
 59. Id. at 43-44. 
 60. See id. at 39 (discussing the “actual damages claimed for loss of business”). 
 61. See id. at 45. 
 62. Id. at 40. 
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B.  A Change in Direction 
During the period between NYT and Rosenbloom, the Court expanded 
the protections afforded to media against defamation in two respects: the 
Court expanded the class of plaintiffs who had to establish actual malice in 
order to be successful in a defamation claim (to include both public officials 
and public figures),63 and the Court made it more difficult for plaintiffs who 
were not public figures to collect damages for reputational harms if the dis-
cussion involved matters of public concern.  However, in Gertz v. Welch64 
and Time, Inc. v. Firestone65 the Court signaled a change in direction. 
1.  Changes to the Application of the Actual Malice Standard 
At issue in Gertz were defamatory comments about Elmer Gertz made 
in an article published in the American Opinion magazine.66  The magazine 
ran a series warning of a nationwide conspiracy to discredit local law en-
forcement67 and published an article about the murder trial of Richard Nuc-
cio, a Chicago policeman who had shot and killed a youth named Ronald 
Nelson.68  In that article, several false statements were made about Gertz, 
including that he had been an officer of a group advocating the violent over-
throw of the government, that he was a Leninist, and that he had been part of 
an organization that had taken part in planning the 1968 demonstration in 
Chicago.69  In its defense, the magazine claimed both that Gertz was a public 
figure, because he was representing the Nelson family in a civil action against 
Nuccio, and that the article involved an “issue of public interest and con-
cern.”70 
The Court rejected that Gertz was a public figure71 and rejected the 
Rosenbloom plurality’s conclusion that the actual malice standard should be 
  
 63. See supra notes 32-45 and accompanying text. 
 64. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 65. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).  
 66. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325-26. 
 67. Id. at 325. 
 68. Id. at 326 (“The article purports to demonstrate that the testimony against 
Nuccio at his criminal trial was false and that his prosecution was part of the Commu-
nist campaign against the police . . . . The article stated that petitioner had been an 
official of the ‘Marxist League for Industrial Democracy, originally known as the 
Intercollegiate Socialist Society, which has advocated the violent seizure of our gov-
ernment.’  It labeled Gertz a ‘Leninist’ and a ‘Communist-fronter.’”); see also Robert 
S. Adler & Ellen R. Peirce, Encouraging Employers to Abandon Their “No Com-
ment” Policies Regarding Job References: A Reform Proposal, 53 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1381, 1405 n.117 (1996). 
 69. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 326. 
 70. Id. at 327. 
 71. Id. at 352 (“[I]t is plain that petitioner was not a public figure.”). 
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used in cases involving matters of public interest even if the plaintiff is a pri-
vate figure.72  The Gertz Court wanted to avoid the “difficulty of forcing state 
and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address 
issues of ‘general or public interest’ and which do not[.]”73  Even if such a 
determination could be made accurately, the Court feared that the distinction 
would not achieve the correct balance between affording adequate protection 
of the press and protecting the reputational interests of private figures.  The 
Gertz Court argued that the Rosenbloom position did too much and too little – 
“a private individual whose reputation is injured by defamatory falsehood that 
does concern an issue of public or general interest has no recourse unless he 
can meet the rigorous requirements of New York Times.”74  However, if there 
were no matter of public concern at issue, then a publisher might be held li-
able “even if it took every reasonable precaution to ensure the accuracy of its 
assertions.”75 
When assessing whether the Gertz Court was correct that Rosenbloom 
afforded inadequate protection to private figures when the allegedly defama-
tory material involves a matter of public concern, one should also consider 
the Rosenbloom plurality’s recommendation that the private figure be af-
forded the opportunity to rebut or deny the charges.76  Perhaps offering an 
opportunity to rebut the defamatory claims would suffice to protect the pri-
vate individual’s interests,77 in which case the remedy would then have the 
salutary effect of not chilling wide-ranging debate about matters of public 
concern. 
A different question is whether the absence of protection afforded by 
Rosenbloom with respect to matters of merely private interest requires correc-
tion.  For example, the Gertz Court held that private individuals could only 
recover damages for defamation upon a showing of fault.78  Further, absent 
  
 72. Id. at 345-46 (“[T]he States should retain substantial latitude in their efforts 
to enforce a legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation of a 
private individual. The extension of the New York Times test proposed by the Rosen-
bloom plurality would abridge this legitimate state interest to a degree that we find 
unacceptable.”). 
 73. Id. at 346. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 47 (1971) (“If the States fear 
that private citizens will not be able to respond adequately to publicity involving 
them, the solution lies in the direction of ensuring their ability to respond, rather than 
in stifling public discussion of matters of public concern.”), abrogated by Gertz, 418 
U.S. 323. 
 77. But see id. at 46 (“In the vast majority of libels involving public officials or 
public figures, the ability to respond through the media will depend on the same com-
plex factor on which the ability of a private individual depends: the unpredictable 
event of the media’s continuing interest in the story.”). 
 78. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347 (“We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability 
without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liabil-
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proof of actual malice, the successful defamation plaintiff could only be 
awarded compensation for actual harms.79  While those actual harms would 
not be limited to injury to reputation,80 the imposition of such limitations (in 
cases not involving matters of public concern) would have been perfectly 
compatible with Rosenbloom’s more substantial protections for discussions 
on matters of public interest. 
The advantages of the Gertz position (as compared to Rosenbloom) 
might seem to be twofold: (1) private plaintiffs who have been defamed in a 
broadcast on matters of public concern would be able to recover actual dam-
ages even if they could not establish actual malice, and (2) it would be unnec-
essary to determine which discussions implicated matters of public concern 
and which only implicated matters of private interest.  The former is a benefit 
only if one accepts that Rosenbloom restricts recovery too severely.  The lat-
ter might be thought a benefit if there were some difficulty in drawing the line 
between matters of public concern versus mere private interest, although the 
Court subsequently interpreted the Gertz approach in such a way that it was 
still necessary to determine which discussions involved matters of public 
concern and which did not.81 
Under the Gertz approach, a private individual who was allegedly de-
famed in a broadcast involving matters of public concern would not have to 
establish actual malice in order to recover damages.  However, a public figure 
or public official who had allegedly been defamed would need to establish 
actual malice.  After Gertz, the issue of who counted as a public official or 










ity for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private indi-
vidual.”). 
 79. Id. at 349 (“It is necessary to restrict defamation plaintiffs who do not prove 
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth to compensation for actual 
injury.”). 
 80. Id. at 350 (“[T]he more customary types of actual harm inflicted by defama-
tory falsehood include impairment of reputation and standing in the community, per-
sonal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.”). 
 81. See Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) 
(reinstituting the need to determine whether a plaintiff had been defamed in the con-
text of a discussion of a matter of public interest, and rejecting the Gertz limitation on 
when presumed damages might be awarded).  For a discussion of Dun & Bradstreet, 
see infra notes 106-34 and accompanying text. 
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2.  Changes in Defining a Matter of Public Concern 
 
In Time Incorporated v. Firestone,82 the Court did two things: it limited 
who might count as a public figure,83 and it suggested some limitations on 
what might count as a matter of (legitimate) public concern.84  At issue in 
Firestone was whether the following news item was defamatory: 
DIVORCED.  By Russell A. Firestone Jr., 41, heir to the tire for-
tune: Mary Alice Sullivan Firestone, 32, his third wife; a onetime 
Palm Beach schoolteacher; on grounds of extreme cruelty and 
adultery; after six years of marriage, one son; in West Palm Beach, 
Fla.  The 17-month intermittent trial produced enough testimony of 
extramarital adventures on both sides, said the judge, ‘to make Dr. 
Freud’s hair curl.’85  
Mary Alice Firestone asserted that the announcement contained defama-
tory claims and asked Time for a retraction.86  Her request was refused.87  She 
then sued for libel, and the trial court awarded her $100,000, a judgment that 
the Florida appellate courts affirmed.88 
On appeal before the Court, Time asserted both that Firestone was a 
public figure and that the divorce involved a matter of public concern.89  The 
Firestone Court rejected that she was a public figure because she had not 
assumed “any role of especial prominence in the affairs of society”90 and 
because she had not “thrust herself to the forefront of any particular public 
controversy in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved in it.”91  
Of special interest was the Court’s suggestion that the divorce did not 
involve a matter of public concern.92  The Firestone Court understood that the 
  
 82. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). 
 83. See Hanrahan v. Horn, 657 P.2d 561, 564 (Kan. 1983) (suggesting that “[t]he 
trilogy of cases . . . Gertz, Firestone and Wolston, limits the status of public figure to 
those who seek to influence the resolution of public questions.”).  
 84. Jacquelyn S. Shaia, The Controversy Requirement in Defamation Cases and 
its Misapplication, 28 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 387, 393 (2004) (“[I]n Time, Inc. v. Fire-
stone, however, the Court defined what a ‘public controversy’ was not.”). 
 85. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 452. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 453-54. 
 90. Id. at 453. 
 91. Id. 
 92. The Court implied that some matters in which the public might be interested 
do not qualify as matters of public concern, although the Court’s comments are am-
biguous. See infra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.  
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divorce had been a “cause celebre”93 and thus might be thought to constitute a 
“public controversy,” 94 which might be taken to mean that Firestone would 
have to be considered a “public figure.” 95  However, the Court rejected the 
equation of “‘public controversy’ with all controversies of interest to the pub-
lic[,]” 96 at least in part, because  the Court did not wish to “reinstate the doc-
trine advanced in the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 
which concluded that the NYT privilege should be extended to falsehoods 
defamatory of private persons whenever the statements concern matters of 
general or public interest.”97  
There are at least two different interpretations of the Firestone Court’s 
position.  The Court might simply have been denying that anyone who is the 
focus of a public controversy is thereby made into a public figure.  By deny-
ing this assumption, the Court would have prevented an end run around 
Gertz.  According to the (rejected) line of thinking, anyone who is the subject 
of a public controversy becomes a public figure.  But that would resurrect 
Rosenbloom and bypass Gertz in effect.  While it would still be true that mat-
ters of public controversy would not themselves trigger the actual malice 
standard, it would nonetheless be true that someone associated with a public 
controversy would thereby become a public figure and would be subject to 
the actual malice standard by virtue of her being or becoming a public figure.  
The Firestone Court may merely have been trying to sever the link between 
an individual’s association with a matter of public controversy and that indi-
vidual being considered a public figure.  If that is correct, then the Court may 
not have been trying to limit what counts as a matter of public concern.  In-
stead, the Court may have been trying to limit who will count as a public 
figure and who will have to establish actual malice in order to receive dam-
ages for injury to reputation.98 
A different interpretation is that the Court was trying to limit what will 
count as a matter of public concern.  For example, the Court noted that while 
“the marital difficulties of extremely wealthy individuals may be of interest to 
some portion of the reading public[,]”99 the “[d]issolution of a marriage 
through judicial proceedings is not the sort of ‘public controversy’ referred to 
in Gertz[.]”100  Here, the Court’s statement seems to suggest that the mere 
fact that a portion of the population is interested in a topic, such as the di-
  
 93. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 98. See also Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979) 
(“Petitioner’s failure to appear before the grand jury and citation for contempt no 
doubt were ‘newsworthy,’ but the simple fact that these events attracted media atten-
tion also is not conclusive of the public-figure issue.”). 
 99. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454. 
 100. Id. 
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vorces of the extremely wealthy, does not suffice to establish that the topic is 
a matter of public concern.101  
At least one Justice supported the latter position.  Justice White in his 
Gertz dissent discussed a series of cases in a footnote, some of which in-
volved publications on matters of public concern and some of which did 
not.102  Included within those cases involving issues that were not a matter of 
public concern was the Florida Supreme Court case Firestone v. Time, Inc.,103 
which Justice White described in a parenthetical as a “divorce of prominent 
citizen not a matter of legitimate public concern.”104  It may well be that Fire-
stone is making explicit a view that was not discussed in Gertz but was none-
theless shared by some members of the Court, namely, that some matters 
published in newspapers or broadcast on TV or radio are nonetheless not 
matters of public concern.  But pointing out that some contents are legiti-
mately matters of public concern but that others are not suggests that the 
Court will have to offer some way to distinguish between the two.  Else, 
judges may have to “decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address 
issues of ‘general or public interest’ and which do not[,]”105 which is a result 
that the Gertz plurality clearly wanted to avoid.  
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.106 resurrected the 
importance of the matter of public concern analysis in the defamation context.  
At issue was a report distributed by Dun and Bradstreet to five subscribers 
indicating that Greenmoss, a construction contractor, had voluntarily filed for 
bankruptcy.107  The report was false.108  Not only had the report “grossly mis-
represented [Greenmoss’s] assets and liabilities[,]”109 but it was one of 
Greenmoss’s former employees, rather than the company itself, who had filed 
for bankruptcy.110  
The jury awarded $50,000 in compensatory damages and $300,000 in 
punitive damages to Greenmoss,111 and one of the questions on appeal was 
whether punitive damages could be awarded absent a showing of actual mal-
  
 101. See id. (rejecting the attempt of petitioner “to equate ‘public controversy’ 
with all controversies of interest to the public”). 
 102. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 377 n.10 (White, J., dissent-
ing). 
 103. 271 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1972). 
 104. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 377 n.10. 
 105. Id. at 346. 
 106. 472 U.S. 749 (1985). 
 107. Id. at 751. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 752. 
 111. Id.  
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ice.112  The plurality read Gertz to limit the damages that could be awarded to 
a private figure on a matter of public concern,113 and the issue was whether 
Gertz also imposed recovery limitations “when the false and defamatory 
statements do not involve matters of public concern.”114 
The Dun & Bradstreet plurality noted that nothing in the Gertz opinion 
indicated that “a State could not allow recovery of presumed and punitive 
damages absent a showing of ‘actual malice[]’ . . . regardless of the type of 
speech involved.”115  Thus, the plurality read Gertz as not speaking to 
whether punitive damages could be awarded, even absent actual malice, if the 
discussion merely involved matters of private interest. 
The plurality’s description of Gertz is accurate in that Gertz did not ex-
pressly distinguish between matters of public concern and matters of mere 
private interest.  But there was a reason for the Gertz Court’s refusal to make 
such a distinction.  The Gertz plurality focused solely on whether the individ-
ual was a public official or figure as opposed to a private citizen.116   An ad-
vantage of restricting the focus to the status of the individual was that the 
lower courts would not be forced to determine which matters were of public 
concern and which were not,117 which at least suggests that Gertz was not 
reserving judgment about the conditions under which punitive damages could 
be awarded where the defamatory comments were made about a matter of 
mere private interest.118 
The Dun & Bradstreet plurality remarked that “speech on matters of 
purely private concern is of less First Amendment concern.”119  The matter at 
issue (the plaintiff company’s credit worthiness) did not involve a matter of 
public concern for several reasons; for example, the report was “made avail-
able to only five subscribers, who, under the terms of the subscription agree-
ment, could not disseminate it further.”120  The plurality also suggested that 
“petitioner’s credit report concerns no public issue . . . [and] was speech 
solely in the individual interest of the speaker and its specific business audi-
  
 112. See id. at 754 (“The instructions thus permitted the jury to award presumed 
and punitive damages on a lesser showing than ‘actual malice.’  Consequently, the 
trial court’s conclusion that the instructions did not satisfy Gertz was correct.”). 
 113. Id. at 751 (“the First Amendment prohibit[s] awards of presumed and puni-
tive damages for false and defamatory statements unless the plaintiff shows ‘actual 
malice,’ that is, knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth”). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 756-57. 
 116. See supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text. 
 117. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 118. See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 772 (White, J., concurring) (“I had 
thought that the decision in Gertz was intended to reach cases that involve any false 
statements of fact injurious to reputation, whether the statement is made privately or 
publicly and whether or not it implicates a matter of public importance.”). 
 119. Id. at 759 (plurality opinion). 
 120. Id. at 762. 
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ence.”121  But this is a surprising view to take.  The credit report at issue 
would have been of interest to various individuals other than the speaker and 
the audience, including Greenmoss Builders, the Greenmoss employees, the 
Greenmoss creditors, and anyone who was thinking of doing business with 
Greenmoss.122  Indeed, the harm to Greenmoss from this defamatory report 
would have been much greater had the report appeared in a newspaper, if 
only because of all of the actions that might have been taken in light of that 
false and damaging report.  But that wider interest in Greenmoss’s creditwor-
thiness suggests that the topic might well have been of public concern.  
Perhaps the case should be limited to its facts.  For example, the plural-
ity seemed to believe that the commercial nature of the information was im-
portant,123 reasoning both that commercial speech would be less likely to be 
chilled even if punitive damages could be awarded absent actual malice124 
and that because the market itself would provide a “powerful incentive”125 to 
provide accurate information, “any incremental ‘chilling’ effect of libel suits 
would be of decreased significance.”126  The dissent also suggested that the 
case should not stand for a broad principle, given the “idiosyncratic facts.”127  
Regrettably, rather than clarify the jurisprudence with respect to matters 
of public concern, Dun & Bradstreet only muddied the waters.  Both the plu-
rality and Justice White in concurrence seemed to emphasize the subject mat-
ter when making the determination that the communication at issue did not 
involve a matter of public concern,128 but the subject matter of Greenmoss’s 
  
 121. Id. 
 122. See id. at 789 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[A]n announcement of the bank-
ruptcy of a local company is information of potentially great concern to residents of 
the community where the company is located”); see also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of 
Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and 
Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697, 745 (2003) (“But the Court went on to hold that a 
report about a company’s bankruptcy wasn’t a matter of ‘public concern,’ something 
that would surprise the company’s employees, creditors, and customers, as well as 
local journalists who might well cover the bankruptcy of even a small company in 
their small town.”). 
 123. See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762 (“[T]he speech here, like advertising, 
is hardy and unlikely to be deterred by incidental state regulation.  It is solely moti-
vated by the desire for profit, which, we have noted, is a force less likely to be de-
terred than others.” (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976))). 
 124. See id. at 762-63. 
 125. See id. 
 126. Id. at 763. 
 127. Id. at 776 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 128. See id. at 786 (“Justice White . . . [in] his opinion does indicate that the dis-
tinction turns on solely the subject matter of the expression and not on the extent or 
conditions of dissemination of that expression.  Justice Powell [writing for the plural-
ity] adumbrates a rationale that would appear to focus primarily on subject matter.” 
(internal citation omitted)). 
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alleged bankruptcy would have been of great concern to many in the commu-
nity.129  Further, the interest in such matters would not merely have reflected 
a possibly inappropriate curiosity about the lives of the very wealthy,130 but 
would have affected the interests and lives of a variety of community mem-
bers.  
Dun & Bradstreet is perhaps more understandable if one deemphasizes 
the subject matter and instead focuses on the fact that the community mem-
bers having a legitimate interest in Greenmoss’s financial condition would 
never have had access to that information, because those who received the 
credit report were bound by a confidentiality agreement not to give that in-
formation to anyone else.131  However, in other cases, the Court has sug-
gested that something can be a matter of public concern even if it is the sub-
ject of a private conversation, 132 so the fact that the report was confidential 
does not provide a satisfying explanation of why a bankruptcy would not be a 
matter of public concern.  
The Court’s defamation jurisprudence has been anything but consistent.  
In some cases, the Court has emphasized whether the individual was a public 
rather than a private figure,133 at least in part, because the Court would then 
not have to determine which matters were of public concern and which were 
not.  However, in other cases, the Court has focused on whether the content 
was a matter of public concern,134 and that determination now can play an 
important role in determining what damages are available to a private figure 
who has allegedly been defamed.  Basically, the Court seems to appreciate 
that there are difficulties in drawing lines both when determining who is a 
public figure and when determining what counts as a matter of public con-
cern.  Regrettably, at least in the defamation context, the Court has not been 
very helpful in providing the criteria to be used when making either of these 
important determinations. 
C.  Matters of Public Concern in Non-Defamation Contexts 
The Court has had occasion to discuss what constitutes a matter of pub-
lic concern in a wide range of contexts ranging from decisions about whether 
public employee speech is constitutionally protected to decisions about 
whether published information contained in a public record is afforded consti-
tutional guarantees to decisions about whether speech in a private setting is 
nonetheless protected because a matter of public concern.  Regrettably, the 
  
 129. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 130. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing the interest that some 
community members have in the details of the divorces of the very rich).  
 131. See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762. 
 132. See infra notes 166-71 and accompanying text. 
 133. See supra Part II.A. 
 134. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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Court has not afforded sufficient guidance to determine which contents in-
volve matters of public concern in these cases either. 
1.  Employee Speech 
In Pickering v. Board of Education,135 the Court underscored the impor-
tance of protecting discussions of matters of public concern, even when the 
individual engaging in the discussion is a private citizen.  Marvin Pickering 
was a high school teacher136 who authored a letter to the editor in a local 
newspaper criticizing, among other things, the School Board’s “allocation of 
financial resources between the schools’ educational and athletic pro-
grams.”137  The School Board fired Pickering for writing the letter, charging 
“that numerous statements in the letter were false and that the publication of 
the statements unjustifiably impugned the ‘motives, honesty, integrity, truth-
fulness, responsibility and competence’ of both the Board and the school 
administration.”138  The Board believed that the false statements not only 
“damaged the professional reputations” of various individuals, but “would be 
disruptive of faculty discipline, and would tend to foment ‘controversy, con-
flict and dissension’ among teachers, administrators, the Board of Education, 
and the residents of the district.”139  
The Pickering Court recognized that “the State has interests as an em-
ployer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from 
those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry 
in general[,]”140 but nonetheless rejected that the Constitution permits teach-
ers to be forced to surrender their “First Amendment rights . . . as citizens to 
comment on matters of public interest in connection with the operation of the 
public schools in which they work[.]”141  The Court noted that “an accusation 
that too much money is being spent on athletics by the administrators of the 
school system . . . clearly concerns an issue of general public interest.”142  In 
addition, with respect to the question of whether the schools needed more 
money (and whether a tax increase was justified), “free and open debate is 
vital to informed decision-making by the electorate.”143  The Court empha-
sized the overriding “public interest in having free and unhindered debate on 
matters of public importance”144 and held that “absent proof of false state-
  
 135. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 136. Id. at 564. 
 137. Id. at 566. 
 138. Id. at 566-67. 
 139. Id. at 567. 
 140. Id. at 568. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 571. 
 143. Id. at 571-72. 
 144. Id. at 573. 
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ments knowingly or recklessly made by him, a teacher’s exercise of his right 
to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his dis-
missal from public employment[,]”145 at least where the teacher is speaking as 
a private citizen.146 
2.  Matters of Public Record 
What counts as a matter of public concern has been an important issue 
in other kinds of cases as well.  For example, Cox Broadcasting Corporation 
v. Cohn147 involved the publication of the name of a young rape and murder 
victim in violation of Georgia law.148  The name was uncovered from an ex-
amination of public records149 and was published in TV broadcasts.150  The 
young woman’s father sued the network for invasion of privacy.151 
The TV station claimed that the young woman’s name was a matter of 
public interest, although state public policy said that it was not.152  The Cohn 
Court understood that there were very important competing considerations 
involving privacy on the one hand and the ability of the press to cover judicial 
proceedings on the other.153  The Court decided to frame the issue narrowly, 
namely, “whether the State may impose sanctions on the accurate publication 
of the name of a rape victim obtained from public records – more specifically, 
from judicial records which are maintained in connection with a public prose-
cution and which themselves are open to public inspection.”154 
The Cohn Court noted that the press has the great responsibility to “re-
port fully and accurately the proceedings of government, and official records 
and documents open to the public are the basic data of governmental opera-
  
 145. Id. at 574. 
 146. Where the speech is offered in the individual’s official capacity, a different 
analysis is employed.  See infra notes 286-87 and accompanying text (discussing 
Garcetti).  
 147. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
 148. See id. at 471 (discussing Georgia law which “which makes it a misde-
meanor to publish or broadcast the name or identity of a rape victim”). 
 149. Id. at 472-73. 
 150. Id. at 473-74. 
 151. Id. at 474-75 (“Although the privacy invaded was not that of the deceased 
victim, the father was held to have stated a claim for invasion of his own privacy by 
reason of the publication of his daughter’s name.”). 
 152. See id. at 475 (“[T]he Georgia court countered the argument that the victim’s 
name was a matter of public interest and could be published with impunity by relying 
on [Georgia law] as an authoritative declaration of state policy that the name of a rape 
victim was not a matter of public concern.”). 
 153. Id. at 491 (“In this sphere of collision between claims of privacy and those of 
the free press, the interests on both sides are plainly rooted in the traditions and sig-
nificant concerns of our society.”). 
 154. Id. 
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tions.”155  According to the Court, the press’s responsibility is especially 
weighty in discussions of judicial proceedings because “the function of the 
press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and to bring to bear the benefi-
cial effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of justice.”156  
In response to the claim that the plaintiff’s privacy had been breached 
though the publication of his daughter’s identity, the Court said, “The com-
mission of crime, prosecutions resulting from it, and judicial proceedings 
arising from the prosecutions . . . are . . . events of legitimate concern to the 
public and consequently fall within the responsibility of the press to report the 
operations of government.”157  In Cohn, though, the issue was not whether 
discussions of the way that the prosecution was fulfilling its legal responsi-
bilities was a matter of public concern, but merely whether the publication of 
the identity of the victim in particular was a matter of public concern trigger-
ing constitutional protection.158 
The Court justified protecting the publication of the information by sug-
gesting that the state itself must have believed it important that the public 
have access to the information:  “By placing the information in the public 
domain on official court records, the State must be presumed to have con-
cluded that the public interest was thereby being served.”159  The state pre-
sumably believed that the public interest was served by having the informa-
tion in a public record, although the state obviously did not believe that publi-
cation of the victim’s name served the public interest, which is why such 
publication had been expressly prohibited.  Thus, the state disagreed with the 
Court that “a public benefit is performed by the reporting of the true contents 
of the records by the media[,]”160 at least insofar as that reporting included a 
rape victim’s name.  
Ultimately, the Court was not really trying to determine whether the 
state in fact believed that publication of a rape victim’s name was in the pub-
lic interest.  The Cohn Court concluded that “the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments command nothing less than that the States may not impose 
sanctions on the publication of truthful information contained in official court 
records open to public inspection.”161  Even if the state had come to the con-
clusion that such publication injured important private interests without any 
offsetting benefits for the public, the Court held that the Constitution pre-
cluded the state from putting that policy judgment into effect. 
The Cohn Court recognized that there were important privacy interests 
at stake, but reasoned that “[i]f there are privacy interests to be protected in 
  
 155. Id. at 492. 
 156. Id. (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966)). 
 157. Id. 
 158. See infra notes 229-48 and accompanying text (discussing the publication of 
a name in B.J.F.). 
 159. Cohn, 420 U.S. at 495. 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id. 
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judicial proceedings, the States must respond by means which avoid public 
documentation or other exposure of private information.”162  States might try 
to protect the information in other ways, e.g., by permitting the records to be 
sealed.163  Or, the states could rely on the good judgment of the media.164  Of 
course, Georgia was obviously not confident that the media would exercise 
good judgment, which is why it passed legislation preventing publication of a 
victim’s identity, and it is not clear why the state’s balancing of the impli-
cated constitutional interests – including the name within the public records 
but precluding publication of the victim’s identity – was a compromise that 
the Constitution precluded the state from making. 
3.  Private Communications 
Cohn involved a very public TV broadcast.  The media obviously 
thought both that the general topic and the victim’s identity were matters of 
public interest and concern.165  Suppose, however, that a particular communi-
cation is not broadcast and instead is merely part of a private conversation.  
Could that subject matter nonetheless be a matter of public concern? 
In Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District,166 the Court 
made clear that communications might involve matters of public concern 
even if they are not published to a wide audience.  Bessie Givhan was a 
teacher who had been fired after complaining in private to her principal about 
the school’s employment practices, which Givhan believed to be racially dis-
criminatory in purpose or effect.167  The Court rejected that “private expres-
sion of one’s views is beyond constitutional protection,”168 and remanded the 
  
 162. Id. at 496. 
 163. Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the 
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1159 (2002) (discussing conditions under which 
records might be sealed). 
 164. See Cohn, 420 U.S. at 496 (“Once true information is disclosed in public 
court documents open to public inspection, the press cannot be sanctioned for publish-
ing it.  In this instance as in others reliance must rest upon the judgment of those who 
decide what to publish or broadcast.” (citing Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 
418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974))). 
 165. As to whether the victim’s name was of legitimate interest, that is a different 
question.  Some courts have rejected the suggestion that something being “newswor-
thy” alone makes it a matter of public concern.  See Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 
18 Cal. 4th 200, 218-19 (Cal. 1998) (“If ‘newsworthiness’ is completely descriptive – 
if all coverage that sells papers or boosts ratings is deemed newsworthy – it would 
seem to swallow the publication of private facts tort, for ‘it would be difficult to sup-
pose that publishers were in the habit of reporting occurrences of little interest.’” 
(citation omitted)). 
 166. 439 U.S. 410 (1979).  
 167. Id. at 413. 
 168. Id. 
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case for a determination of whether Givhan “would have been rehired but for 
her criticism.”169  
Here, the Court did not require that the discussion be published in a 
newspaper or on the radio in order to qualify as a matter of public concern.  
The Court also did not discuss the contents of Bessie Givhan’s comments.  
One could not tell from the Court’s opinion whether she was complaining 
about her own unfair treatment or, instead, about the school’s failure to take 
adequate steps to achieve a more racially integrated school.170  Because the 
content of the speech was not discussed, it was simply unclear after Givhan 
whether an individual who asserted to her employer that she believed that she 
had been the victim of discriminatory treatment would have been discussing 
something that would qualify as a matter of public concern and receive First 
Amendment protection.171  
  
 169. Id. at 417; see also Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 
U.S. 274 (1977) (remanding the case for a determination of whether the teacher who 
lost his job would not have been hired even had he not made certain statements pro-
tected by the First Amendment).  The Doyle Court worried that a “rule of causation 
which focuses solely on whether protected conduct played a part, ‘substantial’ or 
otherwise, in a decision not to rehire, could place an employee in a better position as a 
result of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than he would have occu-
pied had he done nothing.” Id. at 285. 
 170. It is clear from the Fifth Circuit opinion that Givhan was not focusing on the 
treatment that she herself had received.  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals described 
the contents of her complaint to the principal:   
Relatively early in Leach’s tenure as principal 
Givhan gave him a list or lists of what he 
termed “demands” and she termed “requests.”  
These requests all reflect Givhan’s concern as 
to the impressions on black students of the re-
spective roles of whites and blacks in the 
school environment.  She “requested,” among 
other things: (1) that black people be placed in 
the cafeteria to take up tickets, jobs Givhan 
considered “choice”; (2) that the administra-
tive staff be better integrated; and (3) that 
black Neighborhood Youth Corps (“NYC”) 
workers be assigned semi-clerical office tasks 
instead of only janitorial-type work.  
See Ayers v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 555 F.2d 1309, 1313 (5th Cir. 1977), va-
cated sub nom. Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979). 
 171. Such an individual might be protected from retaliation as a matter of federal 
law.  See Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 43 (2005) (“[M]any 
nondiscrimination statutes, including Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, explicitly prohibit retaliation”). 
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D.  Distinguishing Between Matters of Public Concern and Matters of 
Mere Private Interest 
Connick v. Myers172 provided the Court with the opportunity to provide 
more guidance with respect to which matters were of public concern and 
which were not.  At issue were the actions of Sheila Myers, an Assistant Dis-
trict Attorney in New Orleans,173 who “strongly opposed” her transfer to a 
different section of the criminal court.174  Myers discussed with “Dennis 
Waldron, one of the first assistant district attorneys,” her opposition to the 
move, among other matters.175  Myers, who was told that many of her con-
cerns were not shared by others in the office,176 “prepared a questionnaire 
soliciting the views of her fellow staff members concerning office transfer 
policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level of confi-
dence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to work in politi-
cal campaigns.”177  She distributed the questionnaire, an action Waldron in-
terpreted as “creating a ‘mini-insurrection’ within the office.”178 Harry Con-
nick, the District Attorney, then fired Myers, allegedly because of her refusal 
to accept the transfer.179 
Myers claimed that she had been fired because of her exercise of the 
protected right of free speech.180  The district court found that the ostensible 
reason for her termination had been pretextual and that she had actually been 
fired for distributing a questionnaire involving matters of public concern.181  
Because the state failed to establish that the questionnaire’s distribution 
caused substantial interference in the workplace, the district court held that 
Myers had to be “reinstated, and awarded backpay, damages, and attorney’s 
fees.”182  
On appeal, Connick argued that the questionnaire “concerned only in-
ternal office matters and that such speech is not upon a matter of ‘public con-
cern.’”183  The Court accepted Connick’s assessment for the most part,184 
although the Court rejected the contention that Myers’s speech “was wholly 
without First Amendment protection[.]”185 
  
 172. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 173. Id. at 140. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 141. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 142. 
 182. Id. at 141-42. 
 183. Id. at 143. 
 184. See id. (“[T]here is much force to Connick’s submission.”). 
 185. Id. 
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The Court explained that Myers’s speech was afforded constitutional 
protection, although the degree to which it was protected depended upon 
whether the speech at issue was a matter of public concern or, instead, merely 
of private interest.  Speech about matters of merely private interest is not 
“totally beyond the protection of the First Amendment.”186  However, it is 
important to understand the limited degree of protection the Court was afford-
ing the private speech – the Court was merely denying that such speech “falls 
into one of the narrow and well-defined classes of expression which carries so 
little social value, such as obscenity, that the State can prohibit and punish 
such expression by all persons in its jurisdiction.”187  The Court explained 
that “an employee’s false criticism of his employer on grounds not of public 
concern may be cause for his discharge but would be entitled to the same 
protection in a libel action accorded an identical statement made by a man on 
the street.” 188  For example, a false assertion about an important public offi-
cial would not be libelous, absent actual malice.189  
While the constitutional protection afforded to private speech might 
mean that an employee would not be liable for defamation damages for her 
false description of a high-ranking government employee, it is nonetheless 
true that the job protection afforded by the First Amendment for speech on 
matters of mere private interest is nonexistent in most cases.  “When em-
ployee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of 
political, social, or other concern to the community, government officials 
should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive over-
sight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.”190  In many cases 
involving private speech made by a public employee, First Amendment pro-
tections have not even been triggered and thus the federal courts are not the 
appropriate forum to hear the personnel disputes.191  
Yet, some of the speech in Myers’s questionnaire did involve matters of 
public concern, and there had to be some way to determine which speech fell 
into the public concern category and which did not.192  The Court explained, 
“Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern must be 
determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as re-
  
 186. Id. at 146-47. 
 187. Id. at 147. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See id. at 162. 
 190. Id. at 146. 
 191. See id. at 147 (“[W]hen a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon mat-
ters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal in-
terest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate 
forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public 
agency allegedly in reaction to the employee’s behavior.” (citing Bishop v. Wood, 
426 U.S. 341, 349-50 (1976))). 
 192. See id. at 149. 
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vealed by the whole record.”193  When viewing the questionnaire in light of 
the totality of the circumstances, the Court considered “the questions pertain-
ing to the confidence and trust that Myers’ coworkers possess in various su-
pervisors, the level of office morale, and the need for a grievance committee 
as mere extensions of Myers’ dispute over her transfer to another section of 
the criminal court.”194 
Yet, the Court’s conclusion that the questionnaire as a general matter did 
not involve matters of public concern is rather surprising.  The answers to the 
questionnaire on several of these issues would cast light on the operation of 
the District Attorney’s office, which would be of legitimate interest to the 
public.195  However, the Court decided that only one of the questions on the 
questionnaire concerned a matter of public concern, namely, whether any of 
the assistant district attorneys ever felt pressured to work in political cam-
paigns of those supported by the office.196   
If only one of the fourteen questions197 involved a matter of public con-
cern, then the Court’s decision that Myers had not been fired for addressing a 
matter of public concern might seem correct because almost all of the ques-
tionnaire involved matters of merely private interest.198 However, a closer 
examination of the facts suggests that Myers may well have been fired for her 
discussions of matters of public concern.  Connick had objected in particular 
to two questions on the questionnaire: whether the assistant district attorneys 
had confidence in and could rely on their superiors and whether any of the 
assistant district attorneys had ever felt pressured to work in political cam-
paigns.199  Even if one assumes that the level of confidence in the trustwor-
thiness and reliability in the assistant district attorneys’ superiors was not a 
  
 193. Id. at 147-48. 
 194. Id. at 148. 
 195. See id. at 156 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“It is hornbook law, however, that 
speech about ‘the manner in which government is operated or should be operated’ is 
an essential part of the communications necessary for self-governance the protection 
of which was a central purpose of the First Amendment.” (citing Mills v. Alabama, 
384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966))). 
 196. Id. at 149 (majority opinion). 
 197. See id. at app. A. 
 198. The Court seemed to believe that the questionnaire had been distributed to 
provide the basis for a no-confidence vote.  See id. at 152 (“[I]t requires no unusual 
insight to conclude that the purpose, if not the likely result, of the questionnaire is to 
seek to precipitate a vote of no confidence in Connick and his supervisors.”).  Further, 
the Court implied that the analysis would have been different if the subject matter had 
been more clearly a matter of public concern.  See id. (“We caution that a stronger 
showing may be necessary if the employee’s speech more substantially involved 
matters of public concern.”). 
 199. Id. at 141 (“Connick particularly objected to the question which inquired 
whether employees ‘had confidence in and would rely on the word’ of various superi-
ors in the office, and to a question concerning pressure to work in political campaigns 
which he felt would be damaging if discovered by the press.”). 
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matter of public concern,200 that would mean that half of the questions of 
particular concern to the District Attorney who fired Myers involved a matter 
of public concern.  One might then expect at least a remand to discern 
whether that question in particular had played a substantial role in the fir-
ing.201  Instead, the Court upheld the firing, suggesting that when “close 
working relationships are essential to fulfilling public responsibilities, a wide 
degree of deference to the employer’s judgment is appropriate.”202  
In other contexts, the Court has been rather worried about how political 
patronage can compromise First Amendment rights, and the charge that there 
was pressure to work in political campaigns is of great public concern.  In 
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,203 the Court explained,  
Employees who find themselves in dead-end positions due to their 
political backgrounds . . . will feel a significant obligation to sup-
port political positions held by their superiors, and to refrain from 
acting on the political views they actually hold, in order to progress 
up the career ladder.  Employees denied transfers to workplaces 
reasonably close to their homes until they join and work for [a par-
ticular party] will feel a daily pressure from their long commutes to 
do so.  And employees who have been laid off may well feel com-
pelled to engage in whatever political activity is necessary to re-
gain regular paychecks and positions corresponding to their skill 
and experience.204 
Arguably, the questions that were of special concern to Connick (as well 
as some of the other questions) involved matters of public concern.  Of 
course, even if the questions that elicited a negative reaction from Connick 
had involved matters of public concern, that would not have resolved whether 
the speech at issue was constitutionally protected.  An additional considera-
  
 200. But see Eugene Volokh, Response, The Trouble with “Public Discourse” as 
a Limitation on Free Speech Rights, 97 VA. L. REV. 567, 577 (2011): 
Yet Connick involved Assistant District Attor-
ney Myers’s criticisms of the competence, eth-
ics, and trustworthiness of high-level D.A.’s 
office employees, coupled with requests for 
further information relevant to such criticisms. 
Such speech deals with a topic that could be of 
intense public concern, and such speech is 
quite relevant to how “democratic public opin-
ion” could be formed. 
 201. Connick, 461 U.S. at 141 (discussing whether the employee’s engaging in 
First Amendment activities had played a substantial role in the dismissal). 
 202. Id. at 151-52. 
 203. 497 U.S. 62 (1990). 
 204. Id. at 73. 
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tion would have involved the degree to which the distribution of the ques-
tionnaire had disrupted or would be likely to disrupt office operations.  
Employers are not required to wait until harm has occurred before acting 
to prevent a breakdown in office operations.205  Thus, the fact that the district 
court had already found that there was no demonstration that the question-
naire had undermined office efficiency generally or even Myers’s ability to 
perform effectively206 did not settle whether there was a reasonable likelihood 
that Myers’s questionnaire would disrupt the workplace.  Perhaps when find-
ing that the questionnaire did not involve a matter of public concern the Court 
was instead implicitly suggesting that the questionnaire was too disruptive, so 
it did not matter whether that questionnaire merely involved matters of inter-
est to Myers. 
Yet, merely because it is not necessary to establish that harm actually 
occurred to justify a firing does not mean that an individual can be fired be-
cause of the mere possibility that a particular communication would lead to 
decreased efficiency in the office.207  There was a possibility that Pickering 
would not have been able to work as efficiently with his colleagues after his 
letter to the editor was printed, although the Court suggested that such fears 
were unjustified.208  There was some possibility that the relationship between 
Givhan and her principal had been damaged as a result of her conversation, 
but the question for the court on remand in that case was whether Givhan 
would have been rehired but for her comments209 rather than whether her 
comments might reasonably have been thought to impair her relationship with 
her employer.  
The Connick Court did not remand the case to address whether the ques-
tionnaire was likely to cause a breakdown in office operations.210  Indeed, it 
might be noted that the questionnaire might have improved office operations.  
Suppose, for example, that the answers to the questionnaire confirmed Wal-
  
 205. Connick, 461 U.S. at 152 (“[W]e do not see the necessity for an employer to 
allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruc-
tion of working relationships is manifest before taking action.”). 
 206. See id. at 142 (noting the district court’s finding that “the state had not 
‘clearly demonstrated’ that the survey ‘substantially interfered’ with the operations of 
the District Attorney’s office”); id. at 151 (“[T]here is no demonstration here that the 
questionnaire impeded Myers’ ability to perform her responsibilities.”). 
 207. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (discussing “government 
employers’ reasonable predictions of disruption”). 
 208. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 
569-70 (1968) (“The statements are in no way directed towards any person with 
whom appellant would normally be in contact in the course of his daily work as a 
teacher.  Thus no question of maintaining either discipline by immediate superiors or 
harmony among coworkers is presented here.”). 
 209. See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 417 (1979). 
 210. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 154. 
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dron’s view that many in the office did not share Myers’s concerns.  In that 
event, office efficiency might have been promoted rather than undermined. 
Connick also suggests that a speaker’s motivation may affect whether 
her speech is a matter of public concern – the Court noted that “the focus of 
Myers’s questions is not to evaluate the performance of the office but rather 
to gather ammunition for another round of controversy with her superiors.”211  
Yet, the Court did not explain why the individual’s motivation would have 
affected whether particular contents involved matters of public concern and, 
in any event, failed to consider some of the ways that this “ammunition” 
might have been used.   
The District Attorney feared that the next battle would take place in the 
press – he worried that the “question concerning pressure to work in political 
campaigns . . . would be damaging if discovered by the press.”212  His fear 
was understandable.  There might well have been a public furor if it were 
reported in the press both that the assistant district attorneys felt pressured to 
work in political campaigns and that those same attorneys had no confidence 
in the abilities or trustworthiness of their superiors.  The public might well 
have wondered about how justice was being administered in New Orleans, 
which could have resulted, in the words of the Cohn Court, in “the beneficial 
effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of justice.”213  
Suppose that the responses to the questionnaire established that Myers’s 
reactions to office conditions were not idiosyncratic but, instead, were similar 
to those of many of the other individuals working there.  If those results were 
reported publicly, then there might well have been some negative short-term 
effects.  But those short-term negative effects would likely have been the 
result of public furor over how the District Attorney’s office was run, and it is 
hard to imagine how the Court could describe results that might have led to a 
public furor over the operations of the District Attorney’s office as involving 
matters of mere private interest.  Even if the Court had been correct that only 
one of the questionnaire questions had been a matter of public concern, the 
existing jurisprudence would have required a remand at the very least to de-
termine whether Myers’s having asked that question had played an important 
role in her firing. 
The Court’s standard with respect to what counts as a matter of public 
interest often varies from that articulated in Connick, as illustrated by the 
Court’s opinion in Rankin v. McPherson.214  Rankin involved a remark made 
by Ardith McPherson, who was a “deputy in the office of the Constable of 
Harris County, Texas.”215  Upon hearing that there had been an attempt to 
  
 211. Id. at 148. 
 212. Id. at 141. 
 213. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) (citing Sheppard v. 
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966)). 
 214. 483 U.S. 378 (1987). 
 215. Id. at 380. 
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assassinate President Reagan, she said, “[I]f they go for him again, I hope 
they get him.”216  Her comment was made to her boyfriend217 but was appar-
ently overheard by a deputy constable who, unbeknownst to her, was in the 
room at the time.218  The deputy reported the remark to Constable Rankin, 
who fired McPherson.219 
The Rankin Court considered the statement in context and found that it 
“plainly dealt with a matter of public concern[,]”220 expressly rejecting that 
the fact that it had been made in a private conversation operated to “vitiate the 
status of the statement as addressing a matter of public concern.”221  The 
Court noted that the “inappropriate or controversial character of a statement is 
irrelevant to the question whether it deals with a matter of public concern.”222  
Further, once it is established that speech concerns a matter of public interest, 
then the fact that the speech was part of a private conversation “will rarely, if 
ever, justify discharge of a public employee.”223  
There was no evidence that the content of the speech would have im-
paired office efficiency,224 and Rankin had not been thinking of workplace 
efficiency considerations when firing McPherson.225  Indeed, in his concur-
rence, Justice Powell noted that the “risk that a single, offhand comment di-
rected to only one other worker will lower morale, disrupt the work force, or 
otherwise undermine the mission of the office borders on the fanciful.”226 
The Rankin Court focused on the subject matter of the speech – the at-
tempted assassination of President Reagan – and concluded that the topic was 
a matter of great concern.227  Neither the viewpoint nor the context in which 
the comments were made played much a role in the analysis, which was sur-
prising given the Connick requirement that “the content, form, and context of 
a given statement, as revealed by the whole record”228 be considered. 
  
 216. Id. at 381. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 381-82. 
 220. Id. at 386.  But see id. at 397 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“McPherson’s statement 
does not constitute speech on a matter of ‘public concern.’”). 
 221. Id. at 386 n.11 (majority opinion) (citing Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. 
Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414-16 (1979)). 
 222. Id. at 387. 
 223. Id. at 388 n.13. 
 224. Id. at 388-89 (“While McPherson’s statement was made at the workplace, 
there is no evidence that it interfered with the efficient functioning of the office.”).  
 225. Id. at 389 (“Constable Rankin testified that the possibility of interference 
with the functions of the Constable’s office had not been a consideration in his dis-
charge of respondent and that he did not even inquire whether the remark had dis-
rupted the work of the office.”). 
 226. Id. at 393 (Powell J., concurring). 
 227. Id. at 386 (majority opinion). 
 228. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983). 
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The Court was given another opportunity to clarify the criteria by which 
to determine whether speech implicated a matter of public concern in The 
Florida Star v. B.J.F.229  The issue in B.J.F. revolved around a Florida statute 
prohibiting the publication of the name of a victim of a sexual offense.230  
This time the information had not been part of a public judicial record but, 
instead, had been obtained from a police report placed in a pressroom.231 
Rather than use the opportunity to clearly articulate the standard for de-
termining whether speech is a matter of public concern or private concern, the 
Court focused on whether the state could impose liability for publication of 
truthful speech.  As had been true in Cohn,232 the B.J.F. Court listed some of 
the ways that the government could keep such information private: “The gov-
ernment may classify certain information, establish and enforce procedures 
ensuring its redacted release, and extend a damages remedy against the gov-
ernment or its officials where the government’s mishandling of sensitive in-
formation leads to its dissemination.”233  After discussing these options, the 
Court concluded that where “information is entrusted to the government, a 
less drastic means than punishing truthful publication almost always exists for 
guarding against the dissemination of private facts.”234 
In this case, the B.J.F. Court appreciated that the State had significant 
interests in preventing publication of the victim’s identity235 but nonetheless 
refused to uphold liability.236  The Court did not examine whether the pub-
lished information was a matter of public concern, instead focusing on the 
state’s imposition of liability for the publication of “truthful speech.”237  The 
Court worried that “if liability were to be imposed, self-censorship would 
result[,]”238 downplaying the fact that the publication of the victim’s name 
  
 229. 491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
 230. Id. at 526. 
 231. Id. at 527. 
 232. See supra notes 159-163 and accompanying text. 
 233. B.J.F., 491 U.S. at 534. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at 537 (“At a time in which we are daily reminded of the tragic reality of 
rape, it is undeniable that these are highly significant interests, a fact underscored by 
the Florida Legislature’s explicit attempt to protect these interests by enacting a 
criminal statute prohibiting much dissemination of victim identities.”). 
 236. Id. at 541 (“[W]here a newspaper publishes truthful information which it has 
lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when narrowly 
tailored to a state interest of the highest order, and that no such interest is satisfacto-
rily served by imposing liability under [a state statute] to appellant under the facts of 
this case.”).  
 237. Id. at 538. 
 238. Id. 
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was against the paper’s internal policy anyway, so the imposition of liability 
would presumably not do much additional chilling.239  
Both the B.J.F. majority and Justice Scalia in concurrence emphasized 
that Florida had prevented publication by the press but had not, in addition, 
punished publication of the information by private individuals.  The Court 
wrote, “When a State attempts the extraordinary measure of punishing truth-
ful publication in the name of privacy, it must demonstrate its commitment to 
advancing this interest by applying its prohibition evenhandedly, to the small-
time disseminator as well as the media giant.”240  Justice Scalia argued in a 
similar vein: “I would anticipate that the rape victim’s discomfort at the dis-
semination of news of her misfortune among friends and acquaintances would 
be at least as great as her discomfort at its publication by the media to people 
to whom she is only a name.”241  But such a view ignores some of the actual 
harms that the state was likely trying to prevent. 
When B.J.F.’s name was published, she began receiving harassing 
phone calls.242  Indeed, the day after publication, B.J.F. received a call from 
someone threatening to rape her again.243  At this point, the rapist had not 
been caught,244 so B.J.F. had no way to know whether the caller was her rap-
ist or was, instead, someone committing a prank.  While it is fair to suggest 
that “gossip”245 might be hurtful, and it would be uncomfortable and embar-
rassing for B.J.F. to meet with friends and acquaintances who had (or might 
have) become aware of her ordeal,246 those feelings would not compare to the 
absolute terror that resulted after the general dissemination of the information 
and the resulting harassing calls.  While there would be no guarantee that a 
friend or acquaintance would not also decide to make a prank call, the state 
reasonably may have believed that such an event was much less likely to take 
place if there were no general dissemination of the information. 
Justice White’s dissent addressed the issue that would seem to have 
been central in light of the prevailing jurisprudence, namely, whether the 
inclusion of B.J.F.’s name was a matter of public concern.  He concluded, 
“There is no public interest in publishing the names, addresses, and phone 
numbers of persons who are the victims of crime.”247  Arguably, the publica-
tion of a name adds credibility to a story,248 although there might be other 
  
 239. Id. at 528 (“In printing B.J.F.’s full name, The Florida Star violated its inter-
nal policy of not publishing the names of sexual offense victims.”). 
 240. Id. at 540. 
 241. Id. at 542 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 242. Id. at 542-43 (White, J., dissenting). 
 243. See id. at 543. 
 244. Id. at 542. 
 245. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 246. See id.  
 247. Id. at 553 (White, J., dissenting). 
 248. Clay Calvert & Mirelis Torres, Staring Death in the Face During Times of 
War: When Ethics, Law, and Self-Censorship in the News Media Hide the Morbidity 
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ways to enhance credibility without incurring some of the risks resulting from 
exposure of the victim’s identity. 
Perhaps it does not matter whether the communication involves a matter 
of public concern as long as the information is truthful.249  But if that is so 
and if the First Amendment treats the media and private individuals simi-
larly,250 then one would expect much more protection for public employees 
who make accurate criticisms on the job – one would expect that punitive 
measures taken against such individuals, such as firings or demotions, would 
“require[] the highest form of state interest to sustain [their] validity[,]”251 but 
that is not the case.252 
The Court added yet another twist to the difficulties attendant on distin-
guishing between matters of public versus merely private interest in Waters v. 
Churchill.253  The Waters Court addressed the following difficulty: suppose 
that an employer fires a public employee for her speech on what is believed to 
be a matter of private concern but which turns out to be speech involving a 
matter of public concern.254  Should the reviewing court examine the em-
ployment action in light of the employer’s understanding that the speech was 
  
of Authenticity, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 87, 97 (2011) (“[U]sing 
real names adds credibility to a story.”). 
 249. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101-02 (1979) (“[A] penal 
sanction for publishing lawfully obtained, truthful information . . . requires the highest 
form of state interest to sustain its validity.”).  But see Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 
501 U.S. 663 (1991) (permitting a promissory estoppel claim to be advanced against a 
newspaper for publishing truthful information notwithstanding its promise to refrain 
from publishing that information).  
 250. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 773 
(White, J., concurring) (“[T]he First Amendment gives no more protection to the 
press in defamation suits than it does to others exercising their freedom of speech.”); 
id. at 783 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“We protect the press to ensure the vitality of First 
Amendment guarantees.  This solicitude implies no endorsement of the principle that 
speakers other than the press deserve lesser First Amendment protection.”); see also 
B.J.F., 491 U.S. at 540 (“When a State attempts the extraordinary measure of punish-
ing truthful publication in the name of privacy, it must demonstrate its commitment to 
advancing this interest by applying its prohibition evenhandedly, to the smalltime 
disseminator as well as the media giant.”); id. at 542 (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggest-
ing that the media and private individuals must be held to the same standard). 
 251. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. at 102. 
 252. See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 681 (1994) (noting that “poten-
tial disruptiveness was enough to outweigh whatever First Amendment value the 
speech might have had”). 
 253. 511 U.S. 661. 
 254. Id. at 664 (“In this case, we decide whether the Connick test should be ap-
plied to what the government employer thought was said, or to what the trier of fact 
ultimately determines to have been said.”). 
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a matter of mere private concern or instead in light evidence that the speech 
in fact involved matters of public concern?255 
At issue were comments made by Cheryl Churchill to Melanie Perkins-
Graham about what it was like working in the obstetrics department of a pub-
lic hospital.256 Perkins-Graham described some of Churchill’s comments as 
“unkind and inappropriate.”257  Further, Perkins-Graham said to Churchill’s 
superior that management “could not continue to ‘tolerate that kind of nega-
tivism’ from Churchill.”258 
Churchill had a much different understanding of the conversation.  
Churchill had been concerned about a particular hospital policy on “cross-
training.”259  Under this policy, “nurses from one department could work in 
another when their usual location was overstaffed.”260  This “policy threat-
ened patient care because it was designed not to train nurses but to cover staff 
shortages.”261  Churchill had also suggested that some of the “staffing policies 
threatened to ‘ruin’ the hospital because they ‘seemed to be impeding nursing 
care.’”262  Two individuals who overheard the conversion corroborated Chur-
chill’s description of it.263 
The proper characterization of the conversation would seem to be im-
portant.  If it was of mere private concern, e.g., merely involved Churchill’s 
badmouthing her superiors out of anger or spite because she objected to a 
change in her duties,264 then the speech would not be protected and great def-
erence would be given to the employer decision to terminate.265  However, if 
the speech involved a matter of public concern, e.g., patient safety, then the 
speech would have much more protection.  The employer would have to 
  
 255. See id. at 668 (“Should the court apply the Connick test to the speech as the 
government employer found it to be, or should it ask the jury to determine the facts 
for itself?”). 
 256. See id. at 664-65. 
 257. Id. at 680 (internal quotations omitted). 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. at 666 (internal quotations omitted). 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. (“Koch’s and Welty’s recollections of the conversation match Chur-
chill’s.”). 
 264. See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466 (1995) 
(“[P]rivate speech that involves nothing more than a complaint about a change in the 
employee’s own duties may give rise to discipline without imposing any special bur-
den of justification on the government employer.”). 
 265. See Waters, 511 U.S. at 674 (“[W]e have refrained from intervening in gov-
ernment employer decisions that are based on speech that is of entirely private con-
cern.”). 
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show that it was reasonable to believe that the speech would lead to disrup-
tion at the workplace.266 
The Court remanded the case for a determination of whether Churchill 
was fired for her speech on the occasion in question or, instead, for other 
reasons.267  Nonetheless, the Waters Court seemed to undermine the “speech 
on matters of public concern” jurisprudence in a few different respects.  First, 
the Court would not even say whether “Churchill’s criticism of cross-training 
. . . was speech on a matter of public concern[,]”268 which is surprising be-
cause hospital policies affecting patient care would seem to be of great inter-
est to the public.  As discussed in detail below, the Court circumvented this 
determination by concluding it was unprotected as “disruptive” speech. 
Even it if was a matter of public concern, however, the speech would 
not be protected if it was “disruptive.”269  That on its face is not a change in 
the jurisprudence, because the Pickering Court also considered the effect the 
speech would have on the workplace.270  The surprising part of the Waters 
analysis was in what would count as disruptive – the Court suggested that the 
standard would be met if the speech discouraged someone from transferring 
into the department.271  But that means that if Churchill was issuing a warning 
about patient safety concerns and those concerns made someone reluctant to 
join the department, then Churchill could be fired for addressing a matter of 
great public concern. 
It is one thing to say that she should have been fired for her comments 
that were of merely private interest.272  But it is quite another to suggest that 
paradigmatic speech on matters of public concern would justify a firing 
  
 266. See id. at 673. 
 267. Id. at 682 (“A reasonable factfinder might therefore, on this record, conclude 
that petitioners actually fired Churchill not because of the disruptive things she said to 
Perkins-Graham, but because of nondisruptive statements about cross-training that 
they thought she may have made in the same conversation, or because of other state-
ments she may have made earlier.”). 
 268. Id. at 680; see also id. (describing the decision as to whether this was a mat-
ter of public concern was  “something we [members of the Court] need not decide”). 
 269. Id. at 681. 
 270. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 
563, 571 (1968) (“In addition, the fact that particular illustrations of the Board’s 
claimed undesirable emphasis on athletic programs are false would not normally have 
any necessary impact on the actual operation of the schools, beyond its tendency to 
anger the Board.”). 
 271. Waters, 511 U.S. at 680 (“Discouraging people from coming to work for a 
department certainly qualifies as disruption.”). 
 272. See id. at 681 (suggesting that the discharge would be upheld if it was based 
on “the part of the speech that was . . .  not on a matter of public concern”). 
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merely because it was negative and such negative speech might make the 
department a less attractive place to work.273   
The Waters opinion reduced protection for matters of public concern in 
yet another respect by asserting that even if the comments on a matter of pub-
lic concern are not disruptive, the firing will still be upheld as long as the 
employer reasonably believed that the comments were of private interest.274  
In addition, the Waters plurality noted that Churchill’s firing would be upheld 
as long as she was “discharged . . . only for the part of the speech that was 
either not on a matter of public concern, or on a matter of public concern but 
disruptive, [and it would then be] . . . irrelevant whether the rest of the speech 
was . . . both on a matter of public concern and nondisruptive.”275 
After Waters, the jurisprudence on the First Amendment protections for 
a public employee speaking as a private citizen276 on a matter of public con-
cern277 is that such an employee or independent contractor278 cannot have her 
employment terminated because of her speech, as long as the continued con-
tractual relationship would not impair the “efficiency, efficacy, and respon-
siveness of service to the public[.]”279  In the case of a contractor who does 
not have day-to-day contact with the employer, it is less likely that speech on 
matters of public concern would impair effectiveness.280  Nonetheless, if such 
a showing of impaired effectiveness could be made, the severance of the con-
tractual relationship would be upheld.281 
  
 273. But see United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 
470 (1995) (noting that “immediate workplace disruption” is required (citing Waters, 
511 U.S. at 664)). 
 274. See Waters, 511 U.S. at 677 (“We think employer decisionmaking will 
not be unduly burdened by having courts look to the facts as the employer rea-
sonably found them to be.”). 
 275. Id. at 681. 
 276. The individual who is speaking in her official capacity does not enjoy this 
First Amendment protection.  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006) (“[T]he 
First Amendment does not prohibit managerial discipline based on an employee’s 
expressions made pursuant to official responsibilities.”).  
 277. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 671 (1996) (“Umbehr 
spoke at the Board’s meetings, and wrote critical letters and editorials in local news-
papers regarding the County’s landfill user rates, the cost of obtaining official docu-
ments from the County, alleged violations by the Board of the Kansas Open Meetings 
Act, the County’s alleged mismanagement of taxpayers’ money, and other topics.”). 
 278. See id. at 673 (“[I]ndependent contractors are protected, and . . . the Picker-
ing balancing test, adjusted to weigh the government’s interests as contractor rather 
than as employer, determines the extent of their protection.”). 
 279. Id. at 674. 
 280. See id. at 678 (agreeing that “speech threatens the government’s interests as 
contractor less than its interests as employer”). 
 281. Id. at 685 (“The Board will also prevail if it can persuade the District Court 
that the County’s legitimate interests as contractor, deferentially viewed, outweigh the 
free speech interests at stake.”). 
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The Court continues to send mixed messages about the degree to which 
discussions on matters of public concern should be protected.  In Bartnicki v. 
Vopper,282 the Court suggested that the First Amendment protected the publi-
cation of illegally intercepted speech283 that was accurate284 and on a matter 
of public concern.285  However, in Garcetti v. Ceballos,286 the Court ex-
plained, “Government employers, like private employers, need a significant 
degree of control over their employees’ words and actions; without it, there 
would be little chance for the efficient provision of public services.”287  But 
Garcetti  means that the state can punish an individual for speaking about 
matters of public concern even when her criticisms are accurate, if she is do-
ing so in her official capacity.  But it is not clear why the state’s interest in the 
articulation of accurate information on matters of public concern is any less 
weighty merely because a government employee is fulfilling her duty as an 
employee by speaking.  
The Court’s characterization of matters of public concern outside of the 
defamation context has not been especially helpful in delimiting the category.  
Sometimes, the Court has offered a very forgiving standard by implying that 
almost anything contained in a public record qualifies as a matter of public 
interest.  At other times, the Court has implied that the reason that someone 
has discussed a particular topic might itself determine whether that subject 
matter is of public interest.  In addition, the Court has sent very mixed signals 
about the value of speech on matters of public concern, sometimes implying 
that such speech must be protected at great cost and at other times suggesting 
that such speech can readily be sacrificed to promote a variety of other inter-
ests. 
E.  Snyder and an Inclusive Test for Matters of Public Concern 
The Court continued its inconsistent approach to what constitutes a mat-
ter of public concern in Snyder v. Phelps,288 where the Court offered a very 
forgiving standard.  The Snyder Court wrote, “Speech deals with matters of 
  
 282. 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
 283. The publisher of the information was not the individual who had illegally 
intercepted the transmission.  Id. at 525 (“[R]espondents played no part in the illegal 
interception.  Rather, they found out about the interception only after it occurred, and 
in fact never learned the identity of the person or persons who made the intercep-
tion.”). 
 284. See id. at 527 (“As a general matter, ‘state action to punish the publication of 
truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards.’” (quoting Smith v. 
Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979))). 
 285. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 534 (“[P]rivacy concerns give way when balanced 
against the interest in publishing matters of public importance.”). 
 286. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 287. Id. at 418-19. 
 288. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
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public concern when it can ‘be fairly considered as relating to any matter of 
political, social, or other concern to the community,’289 or when it ‘is a sub-
ject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of 
value and concern to the public.’”290  Such a formulation would seem to in-
clude a great deal, since “any matter of political, social or other concern to the 
community” would include a whole host of subjects including, for example, a 
local company’s bankruptcy. 
Yet, the Snyder Court argued that Dun & Bradstreet “provides an exam-
ple of speech of only private concern,”291 notwithstanding that a local com-
pany’s bankruptcy would presumably be of social and financial concern to 
many members of the community.  The Snyder Court quoted with approval 
the Dun & Bradstreet Court’s claim that “information about a particular indi-
vidual’s credit report ‘concerns no public issue’ [and is] . . . ‘speech solely in 
the individual interest of the speaker and its specific business audience.’”292  
Indeed, the Snyder Court believed its analysis of Dun & Bradstreet confirmed 
by the fact that “the particular report was sent to only five subscribers to the 
reporting service, who were bound not to disseminate it further.” 293 
The Snyder Court’s analysis illustrates how confusing the “matters of 
public concern” jurisprudence is.  First, it is of course true that a company’s 
bankruptcy would not merely affect the speaker and the audience but would 
affect a host of other individuals too.  Further, the Snyder Court failed to con-
sider why there was a confidentiality agreement with respect to the credit 
report.  If that information would not have been of interest to anyone else, 
then there would have been no reason to preclude the recipients of the infor-
mation from spreading the word.  (No one would have been interested any-
way.)  The only reason that the confidentiality condition was included was 
that the information was valuable, i.e., would be of interest to others. 
As Snyder further illustrates, the Court has offered an inconsistent ap-
proach regarding what constitutes a matter of public concern, both with re-
spect to what qualifies and with respect to how much protection such discus-
sions should be afforded.  The existing jurisprudence virtually guarantees 
confusion in the lower courts and differential treatment of relevantly similar 
cases. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The NYT Court emphasized the importance of protecting discussions of 
matters of public concern, and the Court expanded the definition of and pro-
  
 289. Id. at 1216 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)). 
 290. Id. (quoting San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83-84 (2004)). 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. (quoting Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 
762 (1985)). 
 293. Id. (citing Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762). 
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tection for matters of public concern in various cases following that decision.  
However, in Gertz, the Court changed direction, belying its commitment to 
encourage the robust exchange of ideas and views on matters affecting the 
public welfare. 
The Court continued to offer an inconsistent approach in subsequent 
cases.  In Pickering, the Court expressly recognized that state employees may 
have special insights on matters affecting the public and that they must be 
afforded protection when seeking to educate the public.  While recognizing 
that speech on public matters cannot be protected at all costs, the Court none-
theless erred on the side of protecting such speech.  In cases since then, how-
ever, the Court has manifested less and less of a commitment to protecting 
speech on matters of public concern. 
Perhaps most disappointing in this area has been the Court’s unwilling-
ness to offer helpful criteria in identifying what counts as a matter of public 
concern.  Sometimes, the Court implies that accurate information must be 
protected.  At other times, the Court has suggested that non-confidential, ac-
curate information about government functioning need not be protected if 
revealing that information would be disruptive, even if the disruption that 
would result would be due to the public furor in reaction to the disclosure.  
Information that would seem paradigmatically about a matter of public con-
cern, e.g., about whether a local company had filed for bankruptcy, is de-
scribed as being of merely private interest.  Information that would seem 
paradigmatically private, e.g., the identity of a rape victim, is protected when 
divulged.  In short, the Court has been sending mixed signals about which 
information qualifies as a matter of public concern and about how much pro-
tection matters of public concern should receive.   
The Court’s mixed signals not only provide no guidance to lower courts 
but also suggest to those wishing to discuss matters of general importance 
that they may be doing so at their own risk.  The Court must offer clarity 
about both what counts as a matter of public concern and about the kind of 
protection that its discussion will receive; else, the public will be denied ac-
cess to information that affects its interests with all of the consequent costs 
that a lack of such information is sure to bring.  
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